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BOOK REVIEW
Digital Demons and Lost Lawyers
Law in a Digital World, by M. Ethan Katsh, Oxford
University Press, Inc. (1995) 294 pages.
Review by Bruce A. Markell*
Where is the Life we have lost in living?
Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?
-T. S. Eliot'
Information tends to drive out knowledge. Information is just
signs and numbers, while knowledge has semantic value. What
we want is knowledge, but what we often get is information. It
is a sign of the times that many people cannot tell the difference
between information and knowledge, not to mention wisdom,
which even knowledge tends sometimes to drive out.
-Heinz R. Pagels2
Will the increased use of computers and networks to process legal
information affect lawyers? This is a question every lawyer ought to ask.
Professor Ethan Katsh answers it with an emphatic "yes" in Law in a
Digital Wrld. Professor Katsh, of the University of Massachusetts, sees
computers and networks radically changing the world lawyers inhabit. He
sees lawyers sifting, sorting, analyzing, and delivering more information
faster. His vision has lawyers changing the ways in which they accumulate
and use information.
* Professor of Law and Louis F. Niezer Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School
of Law-Bloomington. Thanks are due to Julie Veach for excellent research assistance.
Errors which remain are mine alone.
1. T.S. ELIOT, CHORUSES FROM 'THE ROCK' (1934), reprinted in COLLECTED POEMS
1909-1962 145, 147 (1963).
2. HEINz R. PAGELS, THE DREAMS OF REASON: THE COMPUTER AND THE RISE OF
THE SCIENCES OF COMPLEXITY 149 (1988).
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So far, so good. Lawyers will have to adapt to the new technology to
better serve their clients. However, Professor Katsh also sees a fundamental
change in the core definitions and conceptions of the legal profession. "The
underlying theme of this book is that new tools for communicating and
working with information not only affect our ability to express ourselves,
but ultimately bring about changes in what law is and does." 3
I disagree with this prediction primarily because I believe Professor
Katsh extrapolates too much from questionable premises to arrive at his
view of fundamental change. In particular, Professor Katsh predicts
doubtful changes to the concept of a contract along with fundamental
changes in the work of lawyers who work with contracts.
In assessing these predictions, I explore two of Professor Katsh's
premises: his conception of contract law and his view of what lawyers do.
I first want to show that his view of contract law is insufficiently broad to
support the weight of his predictions. Building on this examination, I then
want to contrast his view of lawyers' roles with that found in Dean
Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer,4 in order to show that Professor
Katsh's predictions are based on what I perceive as an incomplete
perception of lawyers and the legal profession.
Even with these weaknesses, however, the book is important and
accurately captures many of the coming changes in the legal profession,5
even if some of these changes will not result in revolution. Rather than
revolutionary, the changes wrought may be no more problematic to the
profession that the changes introduced by the photocopier, the fax machine,
or Federal Express.
I. How LAWYERS USE COMPUTERS AND NETWORKS
Law in a Digital Wrld richly details the ways in which computers
affect and will affect lawyers' professional lives. In particular, Professor
Katsh notes factors that will both increase and decrease lawyers' power and
prestige. As an example, he charts, in the first three chapters, the rise of
3. M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 25 (1995).
4. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
5. In this respect, the book builds on Professor Katsh's earlier work, The Electronic
Media and the Transformation of Law. M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989). And also in this respect, other reviews of Law in
a Digital World seem a little harsh. See Eugene Volokh, Technology and the Future of Law,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1375 (1995) (review essay); Paul Reidinger, Lost in Cyberspace: Does
the High-tech Explosion Make "Thinking like a Lawyer" Obsolete?, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995,
at 104, 104 (book review). But see Thomas G. Walker, Walker on Katsh, Law in a Digital
World, THE LAW AND POLITICS BOOK REVIEW, http://h-net.msu.edu/-books/re-
views/0143.html (Nov. 1, 1995).
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electronic publishing services such as Westlaw and LEXIS, and, in chapter
four, devices to exchange information such as LEXIS Counsel Connect.6
He correctly observes that these electronic media give lawyers unparalleled
access to legal information as well as the text of the law. They can be
better lawyers, so the argument goes, with more information.7 The rise of
the Internet and the increasing amount of legal information that it carries
will further proposition.
This shift to electronic sources, Professor Katsh argues, also has the
potential to disperse or lessen the status of many legal institutions. With
transportable information, for example, the physical importance of law
libraries recedes. Libraries which do not grasp this shift or displacement
are destined to lose their prominence.
The shift also has grave implications for copyright and other methods
of intellectual property protection, as Professor Katsh notes in chapter nine.
He predicts that the combination of several elements-the near-zero
marginal cost of copying, the discretionary enforcement of copyright law,
and the high cost of enforcement-will *change significantly the ways in
which parties protect their intellectual labors.
Professor Katsh finds this shift to electronic resources to be a process
of displacement-as opposed to replacement-of the traditional modes of
getting at the text of the law and of protecting legal interests.' With the
text of the law more widely available, lawyers' control over the interpreta-
tion of the law, and of things legal generally, will lessen.9 And he argues,
more by implication than by direct evidence, that those lawyers who ignore
this displacement and continue on in traditional roles may be relegated to
a status of legal troglodytes. Is Professor Katsh right? Before answering
this question, one first needs to look at his conception of what lawyers do.
6. See also KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 175-78. On February
2, 1996, American Lawyer Media L.P., who originally started LEXIS Counsel Connect,
announced it would buy out LEXIS's minority ownership and will return the name of the
service to its original, Counsel Connect. American Lawyer Regains 100 Pct of Online
Service, BC CYCLE (Reuters), Feb. 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Compny Library, Allnws
File.
7. This access also gives rise to new responsibilities; a failure to consult Westlaw or
LEXIS, which results in the failure to find relevant case law, could be the basis of malprac-
tice. See Duane A. Daiker, Computer-Related Legal Malpractice: An Overview of the
Practitioner's Potential Liability, FLA. BAR J., Apr. 1995, at 12, 19-20.
8. "One theme of this book is that we need to stop thinking in terms of replacements,
of making traditional institutions disappear, and instead observe the process of displacement,
of changing patterns of orientation and operation." KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD,
supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis in original).
9. Id. at 83-88.
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II. WHAT LAWYERS Do
Professor Katsh describes the legai profession "as actually being an
organ of mass communication, as being the means by which law is
communicated from state to citizen."" ° Under this view, each lawyer
serves as "an intermediary who guides the process of learning about legal
matters and who serves as a significant conduit for legal information.""
In short, he believes that lawyers primarily provide information to their
clients, filling the role of brokers of legal information.
With this perception of lawyers in hand, Professor Katsh attempts a
grand historical analogy to assess the effect of modem technology on the
practice of law. He first examines the effect on law when Western culture
migrated from an oral culture to one which used and relied on the written
word. 2 He then compares these observations to the introduction of digital
text and networks. He concludes that Western culture is at the advent of a
grand displacement of the sort introduced by the advent of the written
word.
Professor Katsh's analysis first crystallizes in his examination of the
modem hallmark of the written word's primacy-the contract. If he is
correct that technology and digital law will force society to reconceptualize
contracts and contractual relations, then a revolution is indeed underway.
An examination of Professor Katsh's argument demonstrates that such a
revolution is not likely.
Ill. COMPUTERS AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
Professor Katsh sees one of the fundamental activities of law-
yers-advising with respect to contracts-as an area that technology will
radically change. His notion, however, rests on a view of contracts that is
not necessarily universally adopted or even well-suited to his point. He
promotes the view that contracts are the interconnected web of relationships
between parties, thus adopting the position of Professor Ian Macneil.' 3
The onset of digital technology provides a perfect extension of this view;
10. Id. at 106. This position is a continuation of his view expressed in The Electronic
Media and the Transformation of Law. KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF LAW, supra note 5, at 3-16.
11. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGrrAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 106.
12. Id. at 95-102.
13. Id. at 126-128. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REV.
854 (1978). See also Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational
Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139.
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lawyers can now draft contracts in which the parties' performance can be
monitored in "real" time, thus lessening the possibilities of default and
conflict.1 4
This insight and its expansion to envelop the entirety of contract law
are, however, two different things. As influential as Professor Macneil's
work is, it is but one of the current theories of contract. Other theories
underscore the static nature of contract. Professor Randy Barnett's theory
of contract as promise or consent 5 and other theories 6 emphasize the
binding nature of what one has said. Other interpretations of contract
abound. 
7
Professor Katsh does not dismiss this role, but he does discount it. He
sees the rise of "contracts that exist only in cyberspace and that also cannot
really be duplicated on paper."18 These electronic contracts will displace
paper contracts because of their superiority in dispensing with time and
place restrictions; an electronic contract has no "original," and, thus, no
spatial dimension, and will be dynamic and interactive, and, thus, have no
temporal restrictions. 9 In short, whereas "[p]aper contracts bind parties
to an act .... [t]he electronic contract binds parties to a process."' The
process, I surmise, is one of ongoing compliance and adjustment to changes
in assumptions and conditions.
The consequences of this change, if it occurs with sufficient
robustness to endure, are dangerously oversimplified. One goal of the
Uniform Commercial Code over the last forty years has been to recognize
the importance of continuing relations and the background mores against
which parties act.2 Professor Katsh offers no compelling reason to believe
that his electronic contracts cannot be handled by current law and lawyers.
Instead, he concludes: "rThe new technologies put law in touch with an
information environment that is more dynamic, interactive, and multidi-
14. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 128-130.
15. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986).
16. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTAS PROMISE (1981).
17. A helpful collection of the various theories appears in A Contracts Anthology. A
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY54-128 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995). See also Patrick Atiyah,
Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q. REv. 193 (1978); Jean Braucher,
Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of ContractLaw, 47 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 697 (1990); RFSTATE ENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining a
contract as "a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy,
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty").
18. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 118.
19. Id. at 120-28.
20. Id. at 129.
21. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (3) (definition of "agreement" as "bargain in fact" of
the parties), 1-201(12) (definition of "contract" as a legally enforceable agreement) (1994).
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mensional, and that can more accurately represent the kinds of complex and
delicate relationships that permeate our lives. "I
However, history shows that lawyers will always be consulted to
unravel troubling cases.' Unless artificial intelligence or cognitive science
makes inroads that some think are impossible,' there will always be a
role for humans. Technology's capacity to create complex models does not
mean that those models can imitate our lives or any of our relationships;
it simply means that we can crunch more approximations in less time. The
computer and the network it is connected to are only as good as the
software or programming each has. Inevitably, the complex monitoring and
adjusting have to be thought out by humans, and differences about how to
do such programming have to mediated by humans.
Professor Katsh seems to miss this point because his brittle model of
lawyers as information brokers cannot accommodate it. This is odd; the
role of lawyers in drafting contracts is venerable.-5 Lawyers advise not
only on the consequences of breach, but more often on the ways in which
breach can be avoided or on how to structure relations so that breach is not
an issue. It is more than massaging a lot of information and monitoring
compliance. But Professor Katsh's oversight on this point is part of his
larger misconception of lawyers' roles, and it is to his conception of
lawyers that I now turn.
IV. LOST LAWYERS AND DIGITAL DEMONS: WILL LAW AND
LAWYERS CHANGE?
Certain computer programs are called "demons" because they run
continuously in the background, ready to operate on any preprogrammed
22. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 132.
23. One need only look to the training in declamations given to Roman lawyers to see
that even then lawyers were trained to deal with tough, if not irreconcilable, problems.
E.g., 1 THE ELDER SENECA, CONTROVERSiAE I-VI 465-69 (M. Winterbottom trans., Loeb
Classical Library 1964) (n.d.) (A patron who was on the losing side in the civil war and an
outlaw took refuge with a freedman of his who still owed him services on account of his
manumission. At great personal risk, the freedman took the patron in, but asked him to
waive the services owed. The patron waived them, in writing. Afterwards, when the patron
is restored to his estate, he demanded his services that were once waived. The freedman
objected.)
24. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND (1992) (especially chapter
3).
25. See GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES, reprinted in THE RivERSIDE
CHAUCER 3, 28 (Larry D. Benson ed., 3d ed. 1987) (Description of the Sergeant of the
Lawe: "Therto he koude endite and make a thyng, Ther koude no wight pynche at his
writyng;"). See also C.W. BROOKS, PETrYFOGGERSAND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH:
THE 'LOWER BRANCH' OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 240-42
(1986).
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cue. In some sense, law is like that, providing a background context to the
activities of humans in civil society, ready to offer a remedy if some
precedent provides for it. Digital law may simply make this connection
more transparent; as Professor Katsh notes, the accessability of law will
increase, and the dream and premise of due process-that citizens know the
law-will move closer to realization. I
Two things disrupt that dream, however. First, training in the law
beyond high school civics is necessary to understand both the statutory and
the judicial law that modem society produces. This is not just a phenome-
non of modem times. Non-lawyers' have historically held feelings of
jealousy and antipathy for the apparent hegemony the profession claims on
understanding people, politics, and the interaction of the two." It is
unclear that improvements in computer technology will increase this level
of understanding. The need for a class of individuals who understand and
know the context for law may always exist.
A further analogy to computer demons is apt. Such programs act
without discretion, according to fixed preprogrammed sets of instructions.
Law may similarly provide a set of outcomes for every act, but humans
decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether to invoke the law's protections.
Not every crime is detected, and not every detected crime is prosecuted.
Professor Katsh notes this phenomenon and quotes studies that show that
not all contract breaches are the subject of lawsuits.' From this, however,
he concludes that electronic monitoring provided by the electronic
contract-of which he gives us no example-can increase the well-being of
clients, thus displacing some of the lawyer's current role. As Professor
Katsh puts it, "the core change in the digital lawyer is an understanding of
the value of information in an environment where new tools for processing
and communicating information make adding value to information and
using information to develop new relationships the central concern of the
economic system."29
This goes too far. It misperceives the lawyer's role in drafting
contracts and counseling clients. It also undervalues the role of discretion
in daily affairs and the role that lawyers play in the exercise of that
26. Katsh, LAW IN A DIGrrAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 83-88.
27. Dick the Butcher's comment in Henry VI is the classic statement: "The first thing
we do, let's kill all the lawyers." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING
HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2. A more vehement condemnation is found in the New
Testament: "And he [Jesus] said, 'Woe to you lawyers also! for you load men with burdens
hard to bear, and you yourselves do not touch the burdens with one of your fingers.'" Luke
11:46.
28. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 129.
29. Id. at 174-75.
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discretion by clients. The value placed on how lawyers advise clients to
exercise this discretion is intricately linked to the value placed on the legal
profession. In short, the question evolves into an inquiry as to what
technology will do to the status of lawyers.
That status is the subject of a recent and valuable book: Dean
Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer. In this book, Dean Kronman
examines the role of the lawyer, not only as information broker, but as
statesman and as counselor. While the book is deserving of its own review,
it is interesting to note Dean Kronman's chronicling of the demise of the
lawyer-statesman, the person who "is not simply an accomplished
technician but a person of prudence or practical wisdom as well." 3" The
hallmark of these lawyers is that it is "judgment, not expertise, that
count[s], and it is this quality of judgment that the ideal of the lawyer-
statesman values most." 31
Does Professor Katsh's vision contribute to this demise? Perhaps so,
and that may be reason enough to struggle against allowing Professor
Katsh's predictions to come to fruition. As Professor Katsh writes, "the
successful digital lawyer knows that he or she is in the information business
as well as the legal business and that he or she is competing with others in
the information business, some of whom are lawyers and some of whom
are not." 32 Lawyers will move into the area not just of drafting contracts
and assessing whether some actions breach a contract, but in monitoring
compliance on an ongoing basis. In the future, if not now, a lawyer's
"function [will be] to guide the relationships that are formed between
people and institutions, in a sense to promote the recombining of people
and interests using the new technologies' model of information processing
as a paradigm."' In short, lawyers will be opportunity brokers. As
Professor Katsh states, "the digital lawyer views himself or herself not
simply as a person with expertise in law but as an information worker
whose focus is law."3' The lawyer as "information worker" seems a far
cry from the person of prudence and judgment Dean Kronman extolls. I
think a lawyer is more than that.
Information can be broadly defined as anything which makes a
30. KRoNMAN, supra note 4, at 2.
31. Id. at 3.
32. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 175.
33. Id. at 182.
34. Id. at 189.
35. Id.
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possible state of the world more or less likely.36 Lawyers certainly
provide this type of information. They can, for example, advise that a
particular statute makes a client's planned activity expensive or illegal.37
Do they do more? My answer to that question is that they provide not
just information, but judgment as well. By judgment I mean not only
information-relevant rules, customs, and the like-but also a related
opinion on how the particular facts presented will be resolved or advice as
to the client's best option under the circumstances. To use current lingo,
lawyers not only package and transmit raw information, they add value to
it in the form of their opinions and judgment on how to fit rich facts into
a meager legal landscape.
Moreover, I believe that clients pay primarily for judgment. The
better the judgment, the higher the price. Clark Clifford, in his better days,
was once reputed to have charged and received $10,000 for a brief
telephone call.38 The client paid not for the raw information provided by
Clifford-his assessment of the what the relevant legal rules or customs
were-but rather for Clifford's assessment of the situation-his judgment
of how matters were likely to be concluded.
In short, treating lawyers as "information workers" seems based on
a view that law is a set of rules that can be made known simply upon
inquiry. This view, however, is brittle and insufficiently expansive of what
law is and can be. As every first-year law student soon discovers, the
richness of human experience is no match for the coverage of legal rules.
There are gaps, and lots of them, with each gap full of close cases. As
Dean Kronman puts it:
In some cases, of course, a lawyer's main task is simply to
inform his client about the legal consequences of pursuing a
particular objective that the client has already identified and
chosen. But often the client's objective is hazy, or in conflict
with other objectives, or clear but impetuously conceived. What
is the lawyer's job then? Most lawyers I think would say that at
36. For some discussions of the nature of information, see generally MURRAY GELL-
MANN, THE QuARK AND THE JAGUAR 37-38 (1994); PAGELS, supra note 2, at 149-50.
37. Of course there are lawyers who provide simple or predominantly simple
information. Title opinions in some states and blue sky advice in securities offerings may
be examples of this kind of information.
38. See Gay Jervey & Stuart Taylor, Jr., From Statesman to Front Man: How Clark
Clifford's Career Crashed, AM. LAw.Nov. 1992, at49, 51. Other examples'exist, including
Marty Lipton's eighteen-million-dollar fee in the Pennzoil/Getty matter and Moses Lasky's
million-dollar fee for one brief in Telex's suit against IBM. Debra Whitefield, Texaco and
Pennzoil Shift to Print in War Over Getty, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 1986, § 4 (Business), at
1; The Pervasive Influence ofLawyers, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 1, 1982, at
55.
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a minimum it is part of their job in such cases to help clarify the
client's goal by pointing out ambiguities in its conception and by
identifying latent conflicts between it and other of the client's
ends .... I believe that... most lawyers would... agree that
their responsibilities to a client go beyond the preliminary
clarification of his goals and include helping him to make a
deliberatively wise choice among them. 39
But perhaps that is Professor Katsh's point:
Lawyers need to understand ... that what differentiates them
from others, and the distance that may be said to exist between
lawyers and non-lawyers, is declining. It is not that lawyers are
losing their expertise or not being trained as well, but that the
role and expertise of lawyers overlap more with others.'
In short, lawyers are lost if they cling to the past. If, as Dean Kronman
suggests, lawyers do more than just transmit information because, in part,
the law is more than just rules, then their expertise, their judgment, their
prudence-indeed, their vision-are needed more now than before. Just
because decisions can be made faster does not mean they must be.
4 1
I indicated at the beginning of this review that digital technologies
may have no more impact on lawyers than have photocopiers, fax
machines, or Federal Express. When I entered practice, I was trained by
lawyers whose notion of status in the firm was that they got something
better than the "sixth carbon." Before xerographic technology became
commonplace, all copies of a letter or document were fed into a manual
typewriter interspersed with carbon paper. Although sometimes as many as
ten copies were desired, typically only the first through fifth copies were
legible. Receipt of a legible copy indicated rank in the pecking order.
The introduction of xerographic technology made that reference an
anachronism.42 The subsequent introduction of the fax and Federal
Express made the transmission of such information fast. Lawyers had to
39. KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 128-29.
40. KATSH, LAW IN A DIGrrAL WORLD, supra note 3, at 193-94. It is also possible that
Professor Katsh does not see such a crumbling away of the legal profession, at least so long
as cognitive science or artificial intelligence stays in its current state: "Computers are pretty
good at letting laypeople fill out forms and do paperwork [but] are not so good at replacing
expert human judgment in complicated situations." Come To My Windows, MASS. LAW.
WKLY., May 1, 1995, at B2 (quoting Professor Katsh).
41. This point can be seen from Dean Kronman's suggestions at the end of his book.
They include stressing practical wisdom in the law classroom and the consideration of
smaller firms and more rural settings by law graduates. KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 375-81.
42. Some traditions die slowly. The final version of a legislative bill is the "engrossed"
version, a word which has its origins in a definitive, manually produced text. For a short
history of the "engrossed" Constitution, see Daniel J. Boorstin, Printing and the
Constitution, in DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, CLEOPATRA'S NOSE: ESSAYS ON THE UNEXPECTED
63 (1994).
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grapple with the fact that as the time for communication decreased, clients'
expectations of responsiveness increased. They adapted and continued to
advise with prudence and to temper information with judgment. They may
not like it, and some parts of the profession may have sold their souls
trying to adapt to it, but books like The Lost Lawyer remind us of the noble
core of the legal profession and that we must take action to preserve it in
the face of ignoble influences.
In the end, Professor Katsh has given us a good and provocative look
at what new technologies may mean for the day-to-day practice of law-the
interplay of judgment, advice, and action. But technologies, read broadly,
have changed radically before, yet lawyers still remain; lawyers have
endured in part because these changes have not invaded the core of what
they do.43 They still ply the profession of dispensing advice, of giving
information tempered by judgment. Professor Katsh has shown that the
information part of this description is bound to change, but has not
convincingly demonstrated that the core of the profession-the judgment or
wisdom applied to the information-will follow.
43. See Robert W. Lucky, What Technology Alone Cannot Do, ScI. AM., Sept. 1995,
at 204, 205 ("[A] friend recently wondered aloud if, since technologists now regularly
debate legal issues, lawyers have taken to debating technology. At my next meeting with
lawyers, I asked if this were indeed the case. They looked at me blankly. 'Of course not,'
someone finally said. In fact, lawyers are just as comfortable in cyberspace as are
scientists. It is a social invention. The problems that we all debate pertain to universal
access, rights to intellectual property, privacy, governmental jurisdiction and so forth.
Technology was the enabler, but these other issues will determine the ultimate worth of our
work.").
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